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FAILURE OF GRAND JURY FOREMAN TO SUBSCRIBE
NAME TO INDICTMENT
Kennedy v. 4lvis, 145 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio C.P. 1957)
An Ohio grand jury returned an indictment charging plaintiff with
the offense of armed robbery. The accused entered a plea of not guilty
and upon trial was convicted and sentenced to the Ohio penitentiary.
Subsequently it was discovered that the foreman of the grand jury had
failed to sign the "true bill" endorsement. Habeas corpus was granted
on the basis that the accused's rights were prejudiced. Held, that the
petitioner's substantial rights were prejudiced by not being presented
with a "certification by the foreman of the grand jury to the effect
that the indictment was f6und by the grand jury in the manner provided
by law."'
Under both the Constitution of the United States' and the Ohio
Constitution3 no person may 'be held to answer for a capital crime except
upon the presentment or indictment of a grand jury. However, a
question may arise as to whether an actual indictment has been returned
by the grand jury.4
Ohio Revised Code section 2939.20 reads as follows:
At- least twelve of' the grand jurors must concur in the
finding of an indictment. When so found, the foreman shall
indorse on such indictment the words "a true bill" and sub-
scribe his name as foreman. (Emphasis added.)
The precise effect of a foreman's failure to subscribe his name
on an indictment has not been harmoniously decided among the various
jurisdictions. Courts in Texas have consistently held that the signature
of the foreman is not essential to the validity of the indictment.5 This
is true even when a statute seemingly requires the signature of the
foreman.6 A succinct statement of the Texas position is found in the
case of Day v. State,' wherein it is stated:
Article 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does set out
in detail the requisites of an indictment, and among the other
requirements there stated is the following provision: Sec. 9:
"It (the indictment) shall be signed officially by the foreman
' Kennedy v. AIvis, 145 N.E.2d 361 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
3 OHIO CoNsT. art. I(D).
4"The question presented to the court is not whether there is a defect in
an indictment but whether there is in this case an indictment." Kennedy v. Alvis,
supra note 1.
5 Hannah v. State, 1 Tex. App. 578 (1876); Seary v. State, 89 Tex. Cr.
R. 478, 232 S.W. 319 (1921); James v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 105 S.W. 179
(1907). See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 721 (1924).
6 TEX- CODE CRIM. PROc. art. 396 (1953).
761 Tex. Cr. R. 114, 134 S.W. 215 (1911).
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of the grand jury." This article taken alone would seem to
indicate that the indictment would be fatally defective if not
so officially signed. It will be noted, however, that article 565
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1895 directly refers
to and expressly limits and controls so much of article 439 as
is herein invoked. Article 565, supra, is as follows:
"Exceptions to the form of indictment or information may be
taken for the following causes only: . . . (2) The want of
any other requisite or form prescribed by articles 439 and 466,
except the want of the signature of the foreman of the grand
jury . . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The decision in the Day case, stripped of all other language, turned
squarely on the statute. No contention has ever been seriously enter-
tained by the Texas courts that the foreman's signature is essential to
a constitutionally adequate indictment. For this reason, the Texas decisions
have nothing to offer in the way of a basic argument for, or against,
the requirement of a foreman's signature on the indictment.
North Carolina seems committed to a position similar to that taken
by Texas; however, the most widely cited decision on the question quite
clearly points out that North Carolina has no statute requiring an indict-
ment to be signed by the foreman of a grand jury.' Consequently
here again there is no applicable authority bearing on the Ohio problem.
Iowa has also repeatedly refused to set aside a conviction where
a defect was claimed because the foreman failed to subscribe his name
to the indictment.9 Even though Iowa has what appears to be a man-
datory statute10 requiring the signature of the foreman, the courts have
consistently regarded the statute as directory only.
11
The Ohio Supreme Court has never ruled on the question raised
in the instant case. It may be noted, however, that Revised Code section
2939.20 embodies the mandatory phrase "the foreman shall indorse
on such indictment the words 'a true bill' and subscribe his name as
foreman." In the case of Coburn v. State," - the Alabama Supreme
Court found an indictment to be fatally defective because of the failure
of the foreman of the grand jury to properly subscribe his name as
prescribed by statute. The same conclusion was reached in Whitley v.
State, 3 wherein the court held that "where an indictment is not indorsed
'a true bill,' and signed by the foreman of the grand jury, as required
by Code 1907, section 7300, it is not valid." This widely cited case
is representative of the position taken in most jurisdictions having a
statute similar to Ohio's. 4
8 State v. Avant, 202 N.C. 680, 163 S.E. 806 (1932).
9 State v. Fisher, 172 Iowa 462, 154 N.W. 587 (1915).
10 
IOWA CODE ANN. §772.1 (1946).
11 Waw-Kow-Chaw-Neek-Kaw v. United States, 1 Morris 332 (Iowa 1844).
12 151 Ala. 100, 44 So. 58 (1907).
13 166 Ala. 42, 52 So. 203 (1910).
14 People v. St. Clair, 244 Ill. 444, 91 N.E. 573 (1910) ; Johnson v. State,
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Based on the weight of authority alone, it would seem that the
Kennedy case properly holds invalid an indictment not signed by the
foreman of the grand jury. But, habeas corpus might well have been
denied had proper steps been taken to amend the indictment. Ohio
has a statute of broad import which provides that the court may at any
time before, during, or after the trial amend the indictment, information,
or bill of particulars, in respect to any defect, imperfection or omission
in form or substance, or of any variance with the evidence, provided
no change is made in the name or identity of the crime charged."5 This
statute has been held constitutional even to the extent of permitting
the amendment of an indictment during trial to show venue, where
the offense was sufficiently described. 6 In the case of Pierpont v.
State, 17 the court held that it did not prejudice the defendant to permit
the amendment of an indictment for murder by indorsing thereon the
words "a true bill" where the foreman of the grand jury inadvertently
failed to write these words over his signature. Under the provisions
of Revised Code section 2939.20, it is just as mandatory that the indict-
ment be indorsed "a true bill" as it is that the foreman of the grand
jury subscribe thereon his name. The absence of one can be no more
prejudicial than the absence of the other.
It is submitted that the indictment in the instant case served its
primary function of informing the defendant of the charge and accusa-
tion he need defend against."8 Having done this, there would appear
to be no reason why the judge could not have taken steps to secure
the signature of the foreman of the grand jury. As paragraph four
of the syllabus in United States v. Long'9 states:
Failure of foreman of Grand Jury which voted a true
bill against defendant to sign the bill, because of inadvertence,
related to a merely ministerial act, which could be supplied by
foreman in open court and in the presence of the Grand Jury,
and such procedural defect did not warrant a dismissal of the
indictment.
Such a solution would be in line with the modern trend of our
legislation and jurisprudence which is aimed at preventing an accused
from defeating justice by pleading technicalities that are not in any
way harmful or prejudicial to his rights.2"
M. J. Shaw
23 Ind. 32 (1864) ; Goldsberry v. State, 92 Neb. 211, 137 N.W. 1116 (1912);
People v. Lester, 267 App. Div. 537, 48 N.Y.S.2d 409 (1944) ; People v. Rice,
185 Misc. 473, 56 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1945).
15 OHIO REV. CODE §2941.30 (1953).
16 Breinig v. State, 33 O.L.R. 648, 9 Ohio L. Abs. 333 (1930), aff'd, 124
Ohio St. 39 (1931).
1749 Ohio App. 77, 195 N.E. 264 (1934).
18 People v. Gould, 237 Mich. 156, 211 N.W. 346 (1926).
19 118 F. Supp. 857 (D. Puerto Rico 1954).
2 0 State v. Gates, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 302 (1938).
